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The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP) is the current concept that 
Marine aviation uses to sustain aircraft readiness through the maintenance of aircraft and 
the supply of aircraft parts.  The MALSP is a push system that deploys a large footprint 
of parts, personnel, and supporting infrastructure.  This large footprint, commonly 
referred to as the iron mountain, is expensive to deploy and maintain.  In order to 
minimize cost, an initiative known as the MALSP II has evolved.  Utilizing demand-
based logistics response of the MALSP II, the Marine Corps will deploy a reduced 
aircraft maintenance and aviation supply footprint.  Parts will be distributed through 
various nodes.  As parts are requisitioned, demand triggers parts to be pulled from these 
nodes.  Theoretically, the transition to a pull system would increase response time, 
minimize cost, and decrease wait time.  The purpose of this thesis is to perform a 
qualitative analysis of the MALSP II to identify barriers to modernization and provide 
recommendations to mitigate risk.  Areas of concern include information technology (IT), 
specifically, Marine Aviation Logistics Enterprise Information Technology (MAL-EIT); 
interoperability with Global Combat Support Systems–Marine Corps (GCSS–MC); 
funding, maturity, and supportability, as well as organizational barriers to MALSP 
modernization; and inventory management.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP) is the current concept 
that Marine aviation uses to sustain aircraft readiness through the maintenance of aircraft 
and the supply of aircraft parts.  The MALSP is a push system that deploys a large 
footprint of parts, personnel, and supporting infrastructure.  This large footprint, 
commonly referred to as the iron mountain, is expensive to deploy and maintain.  
Although the MALSP was proven effective during Operation Desert Storm/Desert 
Shield, its inefficiencies in addressing the full range of military operations (ROMO) 
spurred the need to adapt and modernize the program.  In order to address these shortfalls 
and minimize cost and risk to personnel, the initiative known as the MALSP II has 
evolved.  Using the demand-based logistics response of the MALSP II, the Marine Corps 
will deploy a much smaller aircraft maintenance and aviation supply footprint.  Parts will 
be distributed through various hubs or nodes.  As parts are requisitioned, demand triggers 
parts to be pulled from the nodes.  Theoretically, the transition to a pull system such as 
the MALSP II would improve response time, minimize cost, and decrease the awaiting 
parts status at the squadron level.   
In our combined 38 years of experience in the aviation maintenance community, 
we have witnessed several failed attempts at implementing new programs.  From 
personal experience, we have observed the efforts of higher echelon leaders to implement 
programs, only to be weakened by misinformed subordinates who fail to grasp the critical 
concepts necessary to the program’s future success.  This “better way to do business” 
mentality by subordinates prevents the necessary evolution of programs and precludes 
successful adaptation.  The purpose of this thesis is to perform a qualitative analysis of 
the MALSP II in order to identify barriers to modernization and provide 
recommendations to facilitate the transformation of the MALSP II and increase its 
prospects for success. 
Ensuring that the modernization of the MALSP II is a success is vital because it is 
the responsibility of the Marine Corps to be “most ready when America is least ready”  
(Cavallaro, 2010, p. 1).  In order to do be ready, the MALSP II must be able to provide 
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Marine aviation squadrons with the required aircraft parts in a reliable manner to meet 
and, if needed, exceed current readiness goals. 
Through personal experience, research, and interviews with subject-matter experts 
(SMEs) at the MALSP II program office and at intermediate- and depot-level facilities, 
we have identified three predominant problem areas that must be addressed to facilitate 
the modernization efforts of the MALSP II.  Areas of concern include the following: (1) 
information technology (IT; specifically, Marine Aviation Logistics Enterprise 
Information Technology [MAL-EIT]) and its lack of interoperability with Global Combat 
Support Systems-Marine Corps [GCSS-MC], funding, maturity, and supportability; (2) 
organizational barriers to MALSP modernization; and (3) inventory management.1 
A. INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
In April 2012, Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA; 2011a) Policy Letter 03-
11 was updated to clearly delineate the requirements for the MALSP II initial operational 
capability (IOC) to be completed no later than September 30, 2014.  (See Appendices A 
and B for DCA Policy Letter 03-11, as well as Revision A to Policy Letter 03-11.)  With 
the latest revision of DCA Policy Letter 03-11, the requirements to reach IOC have 
become more difficult.  DCA Policy Letter 03-11 (2011a) required “one 
[type/model/series] (T/M/S) detachment or squadron that is demand-pull logistics 
synchronized, maintains Current Readiness (CR) standards, and capable of performing all 
aviation logistics functions IAW MCWP 3-21.2.”  Revision A to Policy Letter 03-11 
required an entire “T/M/S community of aircraft to a level that enables the community to 
achieve and sustain CR performance standards and goals.”  In this paper, we analyze the 
new MALSP II requirements and show that the September 30, 2014, deadline is too 
aggressive and unachievable.  We also identify barriers preventing the MALSP II from 
reaching IOC under the current mandated timeline and what must be addressed in order 
to facilitate the MALSP II transition and implementation. 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
                                                 
1 GCSS-MC is a critical enabling technology for Marine Corps Logistics Modernization strategy and 
provides logistics information to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  
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 In Chapter II, we provide necessary background and historical information 
on the MALS, MALSP I, MALSP II, continuous process improvement 
(CPI), and the Theory of Constraints (TOC) to facilitate understanding of 
the MALSP II system of systems. 
 In Chapter III, we address IT shortfalls that could potentially hinder or 
prevent the transition to the MALSP II. 
 In Chapter IV, we address organizational behavior barriers to MALSP II 
implementation. 
 In Chapter V, we address inventory management and required CPI 
methodologies to successfully transition to the MALSP II. 
 In Chapter VI, we summarize our findings and provide recommendations 
to enable MALSP II modernization. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE HEADQUARTERS AND MAINTENANCE SQUADRON 
Prior to October 1988, and as far back as the 1960s, the primary Marine aviation 
logistics unit for each Marine Air Group (MAG) was the Headquarters and Maintenance 
Squadron (H&MS), affectionately referred to as “hamsters” (Hayn, 1989, p. 10).  Each 
squadron operated uniquely.  According to Hayes (1992),  
the operational structure of the H&MS was not standardized throughout the 
Marine Corps.  Some H&MS were operational squadrons with assigned aircraft, 
while other H&MS had no aircraft assigned and provided only IMA [Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity] support to the air groups. (p. 3) 
The key billet holders (ordnance, supply, maintenance, and avionics) in the 
H&MS simultaneously held positions in the MAG as special staff directly responsible to 
the MAG commanding officer (CO).  This command relationship presented subordinate 
officers with the conundrum of having to report to not only the H&MS CO but also the 
MAG CO, which is directly counter to one of Napoleon’s tenets: “Nothing in war is so 
important as an undivided command” (Headquarters, Marine Corps [HQMC], 2002b, p. 
1-11). 
Wade (2002) suggested that until the late 1980s, the aviation support system was 
“convoluted and disjointed” (p. 8.) Before the MALSP was introduced, there were no 
standardized operating procedures for organizing logistical needs for deployment.  
According to Wade (2002), “no standardized procedures to task organize aviation spare 
parts; support equipment (SE), mobile facilities (MFs), and aviation support personnel 
existed” (p. 8).  The synergistic effect of a lack of a standardized means of tailoring, and 
deploying aviation logistics, without a unity of command2 in the H&MS organizational 
structure resulted in a non-standardized, extremely time-intensive method of supporting 
the warfighter.  For an expeditionary quick-reaction force, this was unacceptable.  To 
adapt to a changing environment and correct flaws in the system, Marine Corps 
                                                 
2Unity of command is the vesting of a single commander with the requisite authority to direct and 
coordinate the actions of all forces employed toward a common objective. 
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logisticians pressed for the implementation of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
(MALS) and the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC; D. Davis, 
personal communication, August 24, 2012). 
B. THE MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SQUADRON 
According to Hayn (1989), “as of October 1988, MAGs were reorganized” (p. 5).  
As a result of the reorganization, the MALS was created to correct the flaws of the 
H&MS command structure.  The MALS eliminated the dual chains of command and 
brought all logistical responsibilities and functions under the MALS commander directly 
responsible to the MAG CO.  The MALS is responsible for providing intermediate-level 
(I-Level) support capabilities to the MAG.  According to Commander of the Naval Air 
Forces Instruction (COMNAVAIRFORINST) 4790.2B (2012), Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP), the I-Level maintenance mission is as follows:  
To enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of 
supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the 
nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure.  
I-Level maintenance consists of on-and-off equipment material support 
and may be grouped as follows:  
 Performance of maintenance on aeronautical components and related SE. 
 FCAs (Field Calibration Activity) which perform I-Level calibration of 
designated equipment.  
 Processing aircraft components from stricken aircraft.  
 Providing technical assistance to supported units.  
 Incorporation of Technical Directives (TDs).  
 Manufacture of selected aeronautical components, liquids, and gases.  
 Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when required.  




Each MALS provides a core group of Marines with expertise in various subject 
matters.  When combining MALS Marines with organizational-level (O-Level) 
maintenance personnel, the result is I-Level maintenance capability, which enables the 
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MALS to support the Air Combat Element (ACE) aircraft readiness.  Figure 1 shows the 
O-Level to I-Level relationship. 
 
Figure 1.   MALS Support Organization 
(From HQMC, 2002a, p. 1-4) 
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) categorizes aircraft readiness 
into three main categories: full-mission capable (FMC), partial-mission capable (PMC), 
and non-mission capable (NMC).  The ability to perform a specific mission and the 
impact of subsystem degradation determines an aircraft’s readiness status.  The 
Commander of the Naval Air Forces (2012) stated, “The CNO establishes 73 percent MC 
and 56 percent FMC as the overall naval aviation enterprise (NAE) aircraft material 
readiness goal” (p. 17.2.1.1).  Aircraft readiness for each T/M/S is dictated by the 
respective T/M/S Mission-Essential Subsystem Matrix (MESM). The MALS 
continuously supports the O-Level squadrons in their efforts to meet these readiness 
goals. 
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C. THE MALSP 
In the early stages of development, the MALSP was referred to as the Marine 
Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC).    The MALSP began as an operational 
concept but has evolved over the years with the advancement of logistical support 
capabilities and information technologies.  The MALSP concept was developed in the 
Cold War era for full-scale operations.  The basic premise behind the MALSP was to 
enable planners to rapidly deploy tailored capabilities in order to effectively support the 
MAGTF ACE.  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 3.21.2; HQMC, 2002a), 
Aviation Logistics, identified the multiple support packages that comprised the MALSP: 
contingency support packages (CSPs), fly-in support packages (FISPs), peculiar 
contingency support packages (PCSPs), common contingency support packages (CCSPs), 
and follow-on support packages (FOSPs), which, in combination with aviation logistics 
support ships (T-AVBs) and maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs), enable the MALS to 
support a variety of aircraft platforms in the composite ACE (HQMC, 2002a, p. 1-9).  
According to MCWP 3.21.2 (HQMC, 2002a), Aviation Logistics, CSPs are the 
basic building blocks of the MALSP and contain the four pillars of an IMA: people, 
parts, MFs, and SE.  The FISP is a support package with all of the necessary O-Level 
parts and supplies needed to sustain a MAGTF ACE for 30 days in a combat environment 
or until follow-on I-Level support arrives in theater.  PCSPs are packages that provide I-
Level aviation supply support and SE to a specific T/M/S aircraft.  CCSPs are packages 
that consist of equipment common to multiple T/M/S aircraft.  FOSPs contain equipment 
vital to sustained operations and are specifically annotated in allowance lists for each 
MALS (HQMC, 2002a, p. 1-9).  Figure 2 depicts the support packages’ composition. 
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Figure 2.   MALSP Support Packages and Composition 
(From Clark, 2010) 
Although the MALSP was revolutionary at the time of its implementation and has 
enjoyed nearly a quarter of a century of success, it has its limitations.  Although proven 
effective in the past, the MALSP is now unresponsive and highly inefficient and has 
much room for improvement (Yasaki, 2010).  According to Davis (2006), the  
MALSP was developed in the cold war era, where major theater engagements 
were the strategic focus. The Cold War has now ended, but the doctrine used to 
support the MAGTF ACE has not.  Since MALSP has been implemented, major 
theater engagements account for just 7% of MALSP utilization whereas 93% can 
be considered smaller scale contingencies. (p. 13)   
The MALSP relies on the deployment of a large cache of parts informally referred to as 
the iron mountain.  This iron mountain requires an excessive amount of manpower to be 
effectively maintained.  Additionally, the deployment of the required personnel is not 
cost effective and unnecessarily places the personnel in harm’s way.  With the majority 
of operations having been small scale since the inception of the MALSP, we argue that, 
on several occasions, we have needlessly spent exorbitant amounts of time and money 
shipping and maintaining the iron mountain.  Yasaki (2010) pointed out that “the vast 
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majority of items may never be used or required” (p. 4.).  The time, money and 
manpower used in shipping and maintaining the vast majority of the iron mountain never 
used should be allocated more productively.  Marine aviation logisticians envision a 
much leaner, more agile, and more responsive system scalable to fit limited contingency 
operations with improved performance at a reduced cost.  Modernization of the MALSP 
through information technologies and CPI will enable aviation logistics to effectively 
support MAGTF operations through the 21st century and beyond. 
D.  THE MALSP II 
MALSP modernization is commonly referred to as the MALSP II, or the Marine 
Aviation Logistics Support Program II.  The MALSP II differs from the MALSP in that 
the MALSP was an operational concept designed to standardize logistics squadrons in 
order to rapidly deploy in support of MAGTF ACE operations.  The MALSP II is a 
logistical concept.  The MALSP II Standard Operating Procedures (Naval Air Systems 
Command [NAVAIR], 2011) stated, “MALSP II strives to reduce the forward deployed 
footprint and increase supply chain agility at the Forward Operating Base (FOB)” (p. 7).  
This concept transitions aviation logistical support from a “push” system to a “pull” 
system of sustaining readiness.  The MALSP II transitions from a “days of usage” to a 
time buffer management system attempting to predict future use.   
The MALSP II is a nodal lay-down broken down to four operating levels, as 
depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   MALSP II Nodal Lay-Down 
(From Steward, 2008) 
The highest level is the Parent Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (PMALS).  The 
PMALS provides primary support to the various deployed nodes and is usually located 
within the continental United States (CONUS).  The next node is the en-route support 
base (ESB).  The ESB is designed to reduce the footprint size in the area of responsibility 
(AOR) by managing the inventory buffer for the forward deployed nodes.  The ESB 
provides a buffer against uncertainty in the reliability of transshipment times between the 
PMALS and forward deployed nodes (Jabin, 2009, p. 6; NAVAIR, 2011, p. 8).  The 
ESB’s goal is to minimize the time to reliably replenish (TRR) to the FOBs.  The third 
level is the main operating base (MOB).  The MOB is located in the AOR, has minimal 
maintenance repair capabilities, responds to local parts demand, and provides support to 
the various FOBs located within the AOR.  The FOBs are parts nodes located with the 
deployed aircraft and provide direct support to the O-Level squadrons. 
The MALSP II leverages recent advances in technology, communications, and 
inventory management practices to rapidly respond to demands placed on the supply 
system.  Additionally, the MALSP II transitions from being reactive to proactive, 
increasing responsiveness and significantly decreasing the number of personnel, parts, 
and equipment deployed under the current MALSP design.  By utilizing information 
technology to present real-time demand data and inventory levels available to 
logisticians, the MALSP II will provide greater “situational awareness” to deployed units.    
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E. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The MALSP II Communications Toolkit (HQMC, 2012b) identified information 
technology as one of two critical enabling capabilities required for the MALSP II nodal 
laydown to function.  Steward (2008) described the system: 
Buffers in the logistics chain are assigned to nodes, each with its own 
value stream, and arranged in a system called a “nodal lay-down,” […] In 
a nodal lay-down, each upstream “parent” node buffers a downstream 
“child” node as demands are placed on the system. For example, when a 
part is issued to the flight line, the resulting transaction creates a signal 
that triggers a series of replenishments downstream until each hole at each 
node is filled. (p. 41) 
Using the Enterprise Logistics Analysis Tool (ELAT) software, the PMALS can 
determine the range and depth of buffers at the various nodes in the supply chain.  These 
buffers are not sized individually but as a whole system.  Parts of limited availability are 
placed at nodes that provide optimal support to the warfighter.   
The MALSP II concept currently utilizes the Stand-Alone Material Management 
System II (SAMMS II) and Expeditionary Pack-Up Kit (EPUK) software to manage the 
detachment inventories and as the deployable host database. These deployable systems 
have web interface capability that allows for global visibility.  The MALSP II Squadron 
Operating Procedures stipulates that SAMMS II “passes Issue and Refer docs via email, 
tracks Retrograde and has World-wide visibility” (NAVAIR, 2011, p. 90).  Additionally, 
SAMMS II provides reports for inventory management and a web portal for parts 
ordering by O-Level squadrons. 
The EPUK was designed to improve the ability of aviation logisticians to operate 
supply buffers in the deployed environment (NAVAIR, 2011, p. 3).  The EPUK also 
connects to the EPUK gateway server.  The gateway server provides decision support and 
routes messages and data sets between EPUK sites (NAVAIR, 2011, p. 4).  
The SAMMS II software is a limitation to the development of the MALSP II.  
SAMMS II is traditionally used for small detachments of aircraft and requires significant 
data entry and processing.  Larger detachments require a more robust database system 
that provides greater logistics management support capabilities.  This increase in 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 13 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
capabilities necessitates significant infrastructure support.  To address this shortfall, the 
Marine Corps is developing MAL-EIT.  MAL-EIT will enable increased support 
capabilities for larger detachments of aircraft and not require the increases in 
infrastructure.  Additionally, MAL-EIT will be integrated with Navy and Marine Corps 
information technologies such as the Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity 
(OOMA) and GCSS-MC (T. Denevan, personal communication, August 26, 2012).  The 
entire MALSP II system of systems relies on CPI to ensure that a steady flow of parts 
moves through the system. 
F. CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
The DCA (2011b) directed that “Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) be 
utilized and integrated along with best practices throughout units to gain efficiencies 
and/or effectiveness in the MALSP II processes” (p. 1).  CPI is the English term for the 
Japanese business model Kaizen.  According to Hudgik (n.d.), “Kaizen was created in 
Japan following World War II.  The word Kaizen means ‘continuous improvement.’  It 
comes from the Japanese words 改 (‘kai’), which means ‘change’ or ‘to correct,’ and 
善 (‘zen’) which means ‘good.’” The Kaizen business model seeks to maximize 
efficiencies of the manufacturer or company and challenge personnel to identify ways to 
increase productivity and cut waste.  MALSs across the Marine Corps, in an effort to 
reduce TRR, implemented the CPI process titled AIRSpeed.  “Enterprise AIRSpeed 
consists of an integrated blend of commercial practices that includes Theory of 
Constraints (TOC), Lean and Six Sigma. TOC is the overarching architecture for 
Enterprise AIRSpeed” (AGI Goldratt Institute, n.d., p. 21).  
1. The Theory of Constraints 
The Theory of Constraints (TOC) is based on the premise that a constraint or 
limitation affects a system and prohibits the system from reaching its maximum potential 
or goal. One overview of the TOC (Pinnacle Strategies, n.d.) identified these three 
underlying assumptions of the TOC: 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 14 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
 Convergence. Inherent simplicity; the more complex a system is to 
describe, the simpler it is to manage. 
 Consistency. There are no conflicts in nature; if two interpretations of a 
natural phenomenon are in conflict, one or possibly both must be wrong. 
 Respect. People are not stupid; even when people do things that seem 
stupid; they have a reason for that behavior. (p. 1) 
2. Lean 
There is a negative correlation between the efficiency of a system and the amount 
of inventory necessary to operate it.  Lean attempts to analyze the movement of parts or 
material through a system in order to maximize efficiency.  The Lean Enterprise Institute 
(n.d.) defines Lean as “creating more value for customers with fewer resources.”  
Maximizing the leanness of a system reduces the amount of inventory required to operate 
the system and decreases inventory costs. 
3. Six Sigma 
Six Sigma is a method of statistical process control.  It analyzes the variation in 
defects within a system.  The goal of Six Sigma is to effectively eliminate defects in the 
system.  A system is considered free of defects when there are fewer than 3.4 defects per 
one million items produced.  “Six Sigma provides a disciplined model that yields 
statistical analysis of variation to focus improvement efforts” (Bethmann, 2004, p. 6.). 
4. AIRSpeed 
AIRSpeed is the overarching program that combines the TOC, Lean, and Six 
Sigma into a CPI program.  AIRSpeed uses rapid improvement events (RIEs) to analyze 
maintenance and supply systems in order to identify and eliminate bottlenecks, identify 
optimal inventory levels, and minimize defects. The Enterprise AIRSpeed Journey (AGI 
Goldratt Institute, n.d.) described how effective implementation of AIRSpeed processes 
can significantly reduce TRR (p. 3.). 
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III. SOFTWARE ACQUISITION: A CRITICAL ENABLER 
In order to appreciate the barriers associated with the aggressive timeline 
constraint placed on MAL-EIT development, further information is required.  We provide 
a brief description of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process to give the reader an understanding of the complexity of the system and the time 
associated with developing, engineering, manufacturing, producing, and supporting a 
program.  Next, we discuss the difficulties associated with developing software as well as 
the related cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs.  Finally, we discuss the issues with 
MAL-EIT and the difficulties with software integration and interoperability. 
A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Over the past two decades, major acquisition reform has made an attempt at 
eliminating redundancy from the acquisition process.  Additionally, reforms have 
provided increased oversight, reduced mismanagement by an untrained workforce, and 
attempted to minimize uncertain planning as well as reduce the number of poorly defined 
capability requirements (Snider, 2008).  Several enterprises have improved areas of the 
defense acquisition process, such as cost estimation and certification in requirements, 
management, and configuration steering boards, but as Snider (2008) pointed out, “the 
fact that reform efforts continue is evidence that lasting reform has been elusive” (p. 20). 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (CJCSM 3710.01H; Joint 
Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2012) provided guidance to the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
the JCIDS process depicted in Figure 4.  This manual included guidance in the 
development of key performance parameters (KPPs), joint capabilities documents 
(JCDs), and capability development documents (CDDs).  CJCSM 3710.01H assisted in 
the development of training and education for acquisition and further explained the 
capabilities-based assessment (CBA) process and its legitimacy. 
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Figure 4.   Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(After DoD, 2009) 
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) described the JCIDS process in the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook as follows: 
The JCIDS process exists to support Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
responsibilities in identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint 
military capability requirements.  JCIDS provides a transparent process 
that allows the JROC to balance joint equities and make informed 
decisions on validation and prioritization of capability requirements. 
(DoD, n.d., p. 1) 
The DoD created the Defense Acquisition Management System to effectively 
manage the development of new technologies from the initial capabilities document 
(ICD), which identifies the users’ needs, through the sustainment of the program.  This 
standardized management system provides for various gates in the development of a 
technology to ensure effective oversight of the program.  The management system is 
imperative because programs may take decades to develop and produce.  DoD Directive 
5000.01 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2007) provided governance for military acquisitions and 
should be referenced for any additional guidance of the defense acquisition process.   
2. Problems With Software Development 
Developing information technologies is critical to successfully transitioning to the 
MALSP II modernization effort.  However, as Osmundson (2008) pointed out, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 17 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
historically software development has not been the most successfully developed 
acquisition: 
SPAWAR [Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command] indicates that 
DoD software developments are still experiencing poor results:  53% of all 
software projects cost nearly 90% over the original estimates, 42% of 
original proposed features and functions are implemented in the final 
product, and 31% of all software projects are cancelled prior to final 
delivery. (p. 64) 
These numbers are less than desirable, but more disturbing is that the necessary 
information technologies needed to reach IOC have yet to reach “program-of-record” 
status.  The DAU Glossary defines a program of record as 
1) Program as recorded in the current Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) or as updated from the last FYDP by approved program 
documentation (e.g., Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), acquisition 
strategy, or Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)). If program 
documentation conflicts with latest FYDP, the FYDP takes priority.  2) 
May also refer to a program having successfully achieved formal program 
initiation, normally Milestone B. (“Program of Record,” 2011) 
The MALSP II Program Office has allocated funding for development of MAL-
EIT through overseas contingency operations (OCO).  Due to continuing resolution 
authority and not having been previously funded through the JCIDS process, the MALSP 
II Program Office is unable to allocate funds under the Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) until a program-of-record status is reached.  This inability to allocate funds has 
resulted in developmental delays in the MAL-EIT software and may prevent the MALSP 
program office from reaching the DCA goals for IOC and full operational capability 
(FOC; T. Denevan, personal communication, August 26, 2012). This lack of available 
funding has had a negative effect on the project and can be further explained using the 
Triple Constraint Theory. 
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B. TRIPLE CONSTRAINT THEORY  
 
Figure 5.   Triple Constraint Theory 
(Melissa-s, 2011) 
The Triple Constraint Theory is based on interdependencies between cost, 
schedule, and performance in a program or project.  A change in one of these constraints 
has an effect on the other two.  Reductions in time increase cost or decrease performance 
requirements to reach the time constraint.   
The Triple Constraint Theory is highly relevant to the MAL-EIT software 
initiative.  Currently, IOC has been identified as fourth quarter fiscal year (FY) 2014.  
The IT solutions necessary to meet this requirement have not reached maturity and, in 
some cases, have yet to be initiated.  As a result, a compression of the time schedule has 
begun that will either increase overall cost or decrease performance of the IT solutions. 
Our recommendation is to extend the delivery date of the software, which will 
prevent successfully reaching the DCA goals in the allotted time period.  However, if 
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MAL-EIT reaches program-of-record status, the program will have a fully funded budget 
through the POM allocations.  Additionally, the program manager (PM) has more 
oversight of the acquisition process because constraints are more effectively balanced 
through the use of milestones and the various gates of the JCIDS process. 
Traditionally, with a compressed time schedule, an addition of capital to the 
program enables the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) to be 
completed within the time allotted.  However, because (1) MAL-EIT is software 
acquisitions, and (2) development is based on a creative process “less able to be known as 
a well-understood process,” increasing funding and manpower will have a negligible 
effect on software development (Osmundson, 2008, p. 76).  As a result, we hypothesize 
that the MAL-EIT software requirements will be reduced, or the current modernization 
efforts will not be fully implemented for an additional five to seven years.  Therefore, we 
recommend a review of the current schedule for IOC implementation. 
C. MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS ENTERPRISE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
 Revision A to Policy Letter 03-11 lists the following required IT capabilities of 
MAL-EIT:  
In accordance with ref (c), the following MAL-EIT requirements and capabilities 
are fielded and sustained within the scope of established Information Technology 
(IT) systems: 
(1) Expeditionary requisition capability with near real time visibility of demand 
across the NLL. 
(2) Physical buffer sizing and TRR analysis. 
(3) Dynamic buffer management capability across the NLL. (Deputy 
Commandant for Aviation [DCA], 2011a, p. 1) 
The MAL-EIT software suites that address the physical buffer sizing, TRR 
analysis, and dynamic buffer management are the Next Generation Buffer Management 
System (NGEN-BMS) and the AIRSpeed Analysis Tool (AAT).  The fact that these 
enablers have yet to be developed presents a barrier to reaching IOC requirements.  
MALSP modernization is an initiative that is instrumental in maintaining effective 
readiness rates—while simultaneously minimizing costs—and mitigating risk to 
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personnel.  Response A to Policy Letter 03-11 identified IT as the critical enabler for IOC 
implementation.  MAL-EIT is a “crucial and distinct component of MALSP II” that will 
enable the paradigm shift required to modernize Marine Aviation Logistics Support 
Doctrine (Clark, 2010, p. 4).  Figure 6 displays the five software suites that encompass 
MAL-EIT. 
AAT LPT                             NGEN-BMS OPTIMIZEREPUK 
MAL-EIT
 
Figure 6.   The MAL-EIT Software Suite 
The MALSP II Communications Toolkit (HQMC, 2012b) defined these software 
suites as described in the following sections. 
1. Expeditionary Pack-Up Kit 
The EPUK is the pilot-detached and -deployed IT expeditionary requisitioning 
capability.  It provides issue/stow/receipt, automated data entry into the Naval Aviation 
Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS), and near-real-time 
data exchange with up-line tiered repositories via gateway servers.  The EPUK hardware 
suite includes site servers, mobile computing capability, and organic wireless 
communications (e.g., local area network and satellite communications).  When fully 
developed, MAL-EIT will integrate with the naval logistics solution for IT, sense and 
respond logistics (S&RL) closely linked to GCSS–MC, Global Command and Control 
System (GCCS) efforts, and other IT tools.  MAL-EIT will provide total asset visibility 
of ACE and MAGTF logistics consumption demands, inventory levels, materials in 
transit, and retrograde shipments. 
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2. The Next Generation Buffer Management System 
From our experience, the NGEN-BMS replaces an access-based buffer 
management tool (BMT) that is currently beset with problems.  The system is an 
integrated web-based tool developed to establish, manage, and monitor both physical and 
time buffers in near real-time across the MALSP II demand-pull nodal logistics chains. 
3. The AIRSpeed Analysis Tool 
The AAT is a software program currently in development to replace the ELAT 
and will be able to interface with the Relational Supply System (R-Supply), the EPUK, 
and the NGEN-BMS.  The interface of these solutions gives users the ability to analyze 
planned versus actual time and physical buffers in near real-time across the MALSP II 
demand-pull nodal logistics chain.  This includes analyzing multiple transportation 
patterns to understand how they are performing, conveying buffer health status 
information between nodes and the P-MALS, and providing the P-MALS with alerts 
when there are vulnerabilities in designed time and physical buffers due to 
insufficiencies. 
4. The Logistics Planning Tool 
The Logistics Planning Tool (LPT) identifies initial outfitting of material for 
deployments, automates container and pallet configuration entries for time-phased force 
deployment data (TPFDD), as well as automates the development, planning, and 
execution of remote expeditionary support packages (RESPs) and CSPs. 
5. Optimizer 
The optimizer is a modeling solution to determine initial MALSP II demand-pull 
nodes for optimal distribution and buffering based on a demand history by national item 
identification number (NIIN) and determines the starting list of parts per contingency 
scenario.  
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D. DEVELOPING THE EXPEDITIONARY PACK-UP KIT 
Currently, the EPUK, the AAT, and the NGEN-BMS are the only IT solutions in 
development.  The EPUK was developed at the SPAWAR as a prototype.  As such, it is a 
nontraditional acquisition and has never been a program of record.  Production of the 
EPUK as a prototype has been beneficial.  Prototyping has enabled SMEs to provide 
inputs to software engineering during the RDT&E phase.  This nontraditional approach 
has enabled users of the EPUK to address specific and evolving needs of the aviation 
logistics community.  Unfortunately, users of the EPUK must address several challenges 
in order to successfully reach maturity.  
The first and largest issue facing the EPUK is the lack of funding.  The Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR), in coordination with the SPAWAR, has funded the 
EPUK program through OCOs funding due to the EPUK’s expeditionary relevance and 
field testing in Djibouti.  Since the end of combat operations in Iraq and the planned 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in the near future, OCO funding is rapidly decreasing.  As 
funding disappears, so does the critically essential knowledge of software-developing 
SMEs that have been working on the EPUK since its inception.   
Captain Tom Denevan, the SPAWAR Marine liaison, highlighted the difficulties 
of holding his team together:  
We started off this year, beginning for FY12, with sixteen people on our EPUK 
team; the developers, business analysts, all the people you need in a team, … 
[developers] that have worked on the EPUK for five years and know it really 
well.  Now we are down to four due to [a lack of] funding. (Personal 
communication, August 26, 2012) 
The EPUK team is in jeopardy of losing all of its experienced developers if the 
funding issues continue to plague the program.  This program is designated as a “key 
capability to ensure MALSP II achieves its goal of providing a responsive, agile and 
sustainable logistics solution” (DCA, 2011b, p. 14-6) in the FY2011 Marine Aviation 
Plan as well as other high-level documents, such as DCA policy letters and the MALSP II 
Communications Toolbox.   
Reliable funding is required in order to maintain the EPUK initiative. Congress’ 
inability to successfully pass a budget has resulted in a continuing resolution authority 
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(CRA).  This is a problem for EPUK because the CRA limits budgetary funding for all 
programs to 80% of the previous year’s budget.  Because MAL-EIT has not reached 
program-of-record status, funding for the EPUK IT solution is zero.  If the EPUK does 
not receive funding allocations in the near future, it will become part of the 31% of all 
software programs that are cancelled prior to incorporation.   
Captain Denevan has identified funding as the largest barrier to EPUK 
implementation.  It is essential to the life of the EPUK initiative for MAL-EIT to attain 
program-of-record status and receive the dedicated budgetary allocations.  Table 1 
identifies the current funding for MAL-EIT, the required budget for development, and the 
cost delta. 
Table 1.   Current MAL-EIT Funding 
(From HQMC, 2012a) 
 
Because the EPUK is so vital to the MALSP modernization efforts, the Marine 
Corps Aviation Supply Logistics (MCASL) is attempting to attach the EPUK to the Navy 
Single Supply Baseline (SSB).  However, SPAWAR’s Program Manager Warfare 
(PMW)-150 is hesitant to make the EPUK a program of record due to compatibility 
issues between the EPUK and the SSB.  The SSB software initiative is a program of 
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record that will encompass all classes of supply for the U.S. Navy and is written in a 
Java-based programming language.  The EPUK is written in Dot-Net, a software 
framework developed by Microsoft that runs primarily on Microsoft Windows.  MCASL 
attempted to nest the MAL-EIT software under PMW-150; however, the PM was hesitant 
to accept responsibility due to concerns about the viability of the EPUK program (T. 
Denevan, personal communication, August 26, 2012). 
Finally, interoperability between the EPUK and the other IT solutions that make 
up the MAL-EIT software suite is essential.  The Marine aviation community cannot 
afford another stop-gap IT solution.  As Captain Seipel (2008) pointed out in his work,  
the number one requirement for an effective logistics information system 
is that it must be integrated.  Data formats must be standardized, and data 
must be shared easily between different modules of the system.  During 
desert storm, one of the many lessons learned regarding logistics systems 
was the “lack of communications and interface between multiple logistics 
IT systems.” The information system of the future cannot allow 
communications to be an impediment. (p. 6) 
Captain Robert Davis (2006), an experienced logistics officer, further highlighted 
the problems with the current system as well as the need to avoid compromising IT 
requirements and to ensure that the community fields a robust interoperable IT solution:  
The lack of interoperability of currently fielded systems creates enormous 
challenges for the tactical-level aviation logistics planner and sustainer.  
Querying multiple systems to source a single operation or contingency is 
laborious, time consuming and inefficient. Decision support for sustaining 
deployed forces is also plagued by numerous manual processes, which 
increases the probability of information redundancy, errors, and 
ineffectiveness.  Aviation logistics support is vital to the combat readiness 
of the MAGTF ACE. The current “flat-file” technology used to mitigate 
the lack of system interoperability is not the 21st century solution for the 
Marine Aviation Logistics community.  It is imperative that aviation 
logistics planners and sustainers at the tactical-level have a robust decision 
support application to accomplish their mission, an IT enabler that has the 
capability to interface with existing fielded systems. (p. 7) 
MALSP II modernization efforts are not achievable without the critically enabling 
software.  Much of the software is not currently in development and has yet to receive 
adequate funding.  These constraints, along with the inherent difficulties of software 
development and the complexities of the JCIDS’s process, severely reduce the potential 
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for reaching the current IOC schedule of fourth quarter FY2014.  Therefore, we 
recommend an immediate reevaluation of the IOC date and award the MAL-EIT suite a 
program-of-record status.  
Once MAL-EIT achieves program-of-record status, the multiple issues facing the 
software suite can be effectively addressed.  The PM will have the necessary tools to 
control the interdependencies between cost, schedule, and performance, which comprise 
the triple constraint.  Additionally, interoperability issues between the EPUK, AAT, LPT, 
NGEN-BMS, and Optimizer will be more successfully controlled. If MAL-EIT attains 
program-of-record status by second quarter FY2013, we estimate that IOC will be 
achieved by second quarter FY2018.  
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS TO MALSP II 
MODERNIZATION 
A. STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
As with many business organizations, the Marine Corps faces the difficult task of 
developing and implementing strategic initiatives—only failure for Marines has much 
higher stakes and could result in catastrophic consequences such as failure to meet 
wartime strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.  Over the past few decades, 
conduct of war has changed to small-scale contingency operation, and the Marine Corps’ 
logistics system must adapt to that change.  The Marines operate in a range of military 
operations that requires flexibility and scalability of its logistics chain.  Although the 
current MALSP is effective, it is inefficient and lacks the speed, cost effectiveness, 
flexibility, and tailoring capability required in today’s environment (Yasaki, 2010).  The 
Marine Corps proposes that the solution to the problem is the MALSP II and has 
developed the system of tools for MALSP modernization.  The follow-on challenges 
come in the implementation process.  Some of the greatest challenges that the Marine 
Corps will face in implementing the MALSP modernization strategy will involve 
overcoming organizational behavior barriers.  In this chapter, we address organizational 
barriers that may hinder the successful modernization of the MALSP II. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BARRIERS TO MALSP II 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Many organizational behavior factors come into play when attempting to 
implement a new transformative organizational strategy.  Organizations, as well as 
humans in general, resist change.  They want to continue to travel in the same direction, 
propelled by inertia.  Giovanni Gavetti (2005), a well-known Harvard Business School 
scholar, argued that organizational inertia is a major factor in the success or failure of 
developing and implementing an organizational strategy.  We borrow from Gavetti’s 
model as we analyze the possible organizational behavior barriers to MALSP II 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 28 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
implementation.  Gavetti (2005) pointed out three critical friction points in implementing 
strategy: 
 sticky routines, 
 ingrained culture, and 
 leadership failures. (p. 8) 
1. Sticky Routines 
When asking why a particular process is the way it is, almost all Marines at one 
time or another have heard the reply, “That’s the way we have always done it.”  This is a 
perfect example of the inertia of sticky routines.  Although there may be a better way of 
doing it, the status quo remains (because the complex system is not understood) until a 
period of revolutionary change occurs. Banach and Ryan (2009) wrote, “Institutions have 
strong motivation to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to naturally resist 
change when recent actions have been successful” (p. 108).  Because the MALSP has 
worked in the past and its processes are familiar, it will be difficult to change to the new 
MALSP II.   
Gavetti (2005) explained that “performance of activities rests on complex and 
highly automated routine processes” (sticky routines), and managers may not have the 
intimate knowledge of these ongoing, intricate processes that they believe they have 
when introducing change (p. 8).  He then explained further that when changing an 
individual routine, there can be unexpected ramifications on the whole: “Once 
[processes] are interwoven into a highly interconnected system, it is difficult to determine 
cause-effect relationships among components of the system” (Gavetti, 2005, p. 8).  This 
lack of intimate knowledge of routine processes compels leaders to overestimate the 
probability of a successful transformation.  Senior policy-making leaders lacking vital 
operational knowledge can make change decisions that may seem, to the tactical operator, 
to go against common sense.  Realizing that the changes make little sense, low-level 
workers continue to stick to the complex routines that were successful in the past.  To 
avoid making uninformed decisions that workers will undermine, it is imperative that 
low-level operators are included in the decision-making process.  Failure to include these 
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tactical operators in the decision-making process adds another barrier to implementing a 
successful change.  Wiser (2009) wrote, 
The complexity of the problems facing naval aviation become apparent 
when one examines the enormous military industrial complex that 
supports Marine Corps and Naval Aviation. The collection of commands, 
military organizations, government agencies, and commercial activities 
required to support Naval Aviation is known collectively as the Naval 
Aviation Enterprise (NAE). These disparate entities operate in a complex 
system that is stove piped, sometimes redundant, and occasionally pits 
elements of NAE at cross purposes with each other. The system has grown 
more complex over time and in some cases, ad hoc solutions and work 
arounds have become institutionalized processes. There is no single voice 
of authority or unifying goal to link all the elements of the NAE together. 
(p. 10) 
The Marine Corps logistics system is composed of many complex automated 
supply and maintenance procedures (sticky routines) and publications that will all be 
affected in one way (some unintentionally) by the strategic shift from the MALSP to the 
MALSP II.  These unintentional effects must be minimized and addressed in order to 
receive buy-in from workers and help workers avoid relying on past routines.  We 
address how the effects can be minimized later in this chapter. 
2. Ingrained Culture 
Although the Marine Corps has developed a set of systems and procedures 
required for the strategic shift from the MALSP to the MALSP II, Gavetti (2005) argued 
that an organization’s “culture can inhibit action” (p. 9).  The Marine Corps has a proud 
history of “doing more with less.”  As Smith (2007) observed, “[A]t the end of World 
War II, Marine salvage teams had looked around the Pacific islands for abandoned 
equipment.  Then they brought it back to Barstow, re-painted it ‘Marine green,’ stenciled 
‘USMC’ on it, and ‘mothballed’ it for future” (p. 15).  Chesty Puller, an iconic Marine, 
was well known for having ordered Marines to gather all abandoned Army equipment of 
withdrawing Soldiers and put it to good use.  Kelly Crigger (2010) highlighted an 
example of Chesty Puller exemplifying the resourceful Marine culture by scavenging 
Army gear left on the battlefield:  “Puller allegedly told an Army colonel who demanded 
return of the equipment: ‘It all has USMC markings on it now and if you want it back, 
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kick my ass’ [emphasis added]. No challenge was made thereafter” (p. 80).  In an 
atmosphere of tightening budgets and downsizing and a pervasive culture of “do more 
with less,” it is not surprising that Marines feel pressured to bend the rules and “do 
whatever it takes” to get the job done.   
Doing whatever it takes has sometimes come in the form of unauthorized parts 
lockers (UPLs).3  UPLs are typically unauthorized stockpiles of high-cost repairable 
parts4 but can include any unauthorized part.  Historically, maintenance material control 
officers (MMCOs), maintenance control chiefs, and other maintenance Marines 
stockpiled these unauthorized parts with the hopes of quickly repairing an aircraft that 
became PMC or NMC.  We suggest that this subculture of doing whatever it takes, 
however well intentioned, would undermine the MALSP II initiative.  Although this 
particular cultural trait of Marine resourcefulness may have paid dividends in the past, it 
has no place in the current operating environment.  UPLs are counterproductive to the 
doctrinal shift from the MALSP to the MALSP II.  As Robbins and Judge (2012) pointed 
out, “Culture is a liability when the shared values are not in agreement with those that 
further the organization’s effectiveness” (p. 222).  This subculture’s shared values of 
maintaining UPLs are inconsistent with Marine values and have the potential to 
negatively impact overall readiness. 
Aircraft readiness is a metric by which MMCOs and maintenance control chiefs 
are measured.  The perception is that higher echelon commands compare squadrons and 
commanding officers based on readiness.  Although the term 
readiness is universally understood in Marine Corps aviation, it is relative.  The Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) looks at readiness across the fleet as a whole and as a platform 
average.   
Although MMCOs and maintenance control chiefs try to meet the CNO’s goals, 
their number one priority is their individual squadron’s readiness.  They are under 
continuous pressure from senior leaders to produce aircraft for the flight schedule and 
                                                 
 3Unauthorized parts locker is a term we coined in this thesis in order to limit confusion between 
authorized pre-expended bins (PEBs) and unauthorized parts lockers (UPLs). 
4 Repairable parts can be repaired or overhauled when they break or reach the end of their life cycle. 
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usually bear the responsibility for an unresponsive supply system.  For this and many 
other reasons, MMCOs and maintenance control chiefs will go to great lengths to ensure 
that their unit is the squadron with the best readiness.  A culture of high competition, high 
operational tempo, and a lack of confidence in the supply system leads Marines to 
maintain UPLs. 
a. When Subculture Dominates Organizational Culture 
Effects of Unauthorized Parts Lockers on the MALSP II:   
In COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B, the Commander of the Naval Air 
Forces (2012) stated, “Navy stock is generally replenished on a system basis as a direct 
result of recorded usage and demand data” (p. 9.1.1.1). When a part is lost or rerouted to 
a UPL, the part is surveyed.5  This part has to be replaced in order for the supply system 
to continue to provide the same level of support to the fleet.  Lost or stolen parts place an 
extra cost burden on the supply system.  If Marines pull parts from UPLs, then the 
potential exists to show no demand data for the item with either the MALSP II or the 
supply system for which ordering and resupply purchases are based on.  This lack of data 
results in inadequately stocked buffers and fewer parts available for the Marines in the 
future.  Additionally, this practice could result in a lack of parts in the system when 
implementing the MALSP II on a platform-wide scale.  If squadrons hoard parts in UPLs, 
other squadrons around the world have no visibility of these assets.  Subsequently, any 
single NMC discrepancy on aircraft that could use parts from these UPLs would translate 
to a direct decrease in aviation readiness and an increased cost burden. 
b. Potential Monetary Costs of the Use of Unauthorized Parts 
Lockers in Marine Aviation 
In an attempt to quantify the potential cost of UPLs on Marine aviation, 
we calculate the cost estimates based on historical data.  Table 2 shows the calculated 
costs associated with UPLs used in the past.  We monetize each UPL by looking up each 
                                                 
5 A survey is the procedure required when Navy property (except incoming shipments) is lost, 
damaged, or destroyed.  The  purpose  of  a  survey  is  to  determine (1) the responsibility for the lost, 
damaged, or destroyed property; and (2) the  actual  loss  to  the government. 
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part in WebFLIS to determine a cost.  For each UPL that had items with no cost data, we 
determined the average cost of the missing items using the following equations: 
total cost of UPL ÷ total line items = average cost of UPL line item, 
and 
average cost of UPL line item × number of missing items = estimated cost 
of missing items in that UPL. 
We used this procedure for each UPL and produced two costs: the actual 
UPL cost (the sum cost of all items we looked up in WebFLIS) and the estimated UPL 
cost, including the estimated cost of line items with missing data.  Next, based on 786 
squadrons in the Marine Corps, we conducted a sensitivity analysis, ranging from 10% to 
80%, to estimate the potential costs associated with a UPL percentage usage in the 
aviation community.  Based on the UPL data we received, we determined the two costs 
mentioned previously.  The data represent an actual 7.6% use, equating to an actual cost 
of $17.6 million and an estimated cost of $20.08 million (based on an estimate of the line 
items with missing data).  Table 2 shows our cost data for each UPL.   
                                                 
6 This number fluctuates due to multiple squadrons being decommissioned to meet downsizing 
requirements. 
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Figure 7 is a sensitivity analysis chart showing what the estimated costs 
would be based on the percentage of squadrons using UPLs.  Because we did not have 
actual overall usage data, at most, we provide a “what if” analysis.  If a survey of the fleet 
were conducted, the extent of UPL usage could be determined and a more accurate 
number could be established to determine the associated costs. 
 
The estimated cost of missing items for each UPL is based on the average cost per line item of that UPL. 
The total estimated worth of all missing items is based on the average cost per line item spread over all 
UPLs and multiplied by the number of missing data items for all UPLs. 
*Denotes consumable parts mixed in with repairable parts. 
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Figure 7.   Estimated Cost vs. Percentage of Squadrons in the Fleet Using UPLs 
An interview with an MALSP II PM revealed that HQMC initially wanted 
to use the entire CH-53E helicopter platform as a test bed for the MALSP II program; 
however, there were not enough CH-53E parts available in the system to stock the buffers 
needed to implement the MALSP II platform-wide.  Instead, the MALSP II was piloted 
by MALS-26 on a reduced scale in Al Asad, Iraq, in 2005.  According to the MALSP II 
Communications Toolkit (HQMC, 2012b), “During the prototype, the availability of 
selected materials essential to forward-deployed operations increased from 44 percent to 
98 percent” (p. 20). The MALSP II initiative was implemented again in 2008 with a 
small four-plane detachment in the Horn of Africa and continues to provide successful 
results.  
Many platforms across the Marine Corps are experiencing parts shortages.  
For example, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2005), “the 
Marine Corps’ CH-53E helicopter received a red rating (indicates significant concern) for 
its near-term program strategy and funding plan because the service may be unable to 
meet its near-term requirements due to potential aircraft and repair shortages” (p. 136).  
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could be a contributing factor and could also contribute to higher costs and lower overall 
readiness throughout the fleet.   
Maintaining UPLs in the fleet could also cause strained relations and 
create mistrust between supply and maintenance.  One effect of maintaining UPLs is the 
hindering of the free flow of information and supplies between maintenance and supply.  
Maintainers, acting under old paradigms of a slow and unresponsive paper supply system, 
attempt to maintain UPLs to give themselves an advantage in readiness, not realizing that 
they cause more harm than good.  At the same time, supply Marines attempt to recover 
lost assets and catch maintainers in the act.  We suggest that the MALSP II program will 
not function as it was intended under the umbrella of UPLs.  Not only does UPL 
maintenance degrade the supply system, but it is also inconsistent with Marine values.  
To fully stock its buffers and enable the supply system to accurately stock its shelves—
thereby ensuring that squadrons have the parts required to achieve CNO-mandated 
readiness goals—UPLs must be eliminated where they exist. 
3. Leadership Failure 
For the purposes of MALSP II implementation, we use Gavetti’s (2005) narrow 
definition of leadership: “guidance toward a strategy implementation goal” (p. 10).  
Gavetti proposed that one of the major causes of leadership’s failure to successfully 
implement strategy is an attachment to the status quo.  The Marine Corps has used the 
MALSP for nearly a quarter of a century.  MALSP practices and procedures are 
embedded in the rank and file of Marine aviation logisticians, MAG and wing 
commanding officers, as well as other key stakeholders.  Yasaki (2010) highlighted the 
difficulties with senior leaders: 
Senior enlisted and officers who have been in the Marine Corps for at least a 
decade and who have seen other initiatives introduced and eventually die off—
rings a cliché about old dogs and new tricks. Applying the concepts associated 
with TRR is just as important to the lieutenant colonel and master sergeant as it is 
to the lance corporal. One level leads and enforces; the other executes. Getting 
everyone to understand, accept, and adopt these concepts will take a little time. 
(p. 4) 
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Leaders must overcome this strong inertia in order for the new MALSP II to be 
successfully implemented.  Regarding an attachment to the status quo, Gavetti (2005) 
listed numerous factors that can ultimately cause leadership to fail at implementing 
strategy.  Such factors include lack of incentives to implement change, fear of the 
unknown, and lack of skills to carry out new strategies (Gavetti, 2005, p. 10).  A 
continuing theme surrounding the implementation of the MALSP II is that the program is 
a leap of faith for the stakeholders.  This does not have to be the case.  A transparent 
process with educated stakeholders will eliminate the need for a “leap of faith.”  Thus far, 
many of the upper echelon key stakeholders have been educated in the MALSP II 
transition through initiatives like the MALSP II Communication Toolkit (2012).  These 
stakeholders understand the MALSP II transition on the strategic level.  Unfortunately, 
the mid- to lower-level managers and operators are almost entirely uninformed of the 
process.   
C. ADDRESSING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BARRIERS TO 
IMPLEMENTING THE MALSP II 
1. Addressing Sticky Routines 
Sticky routines can be addressed by building commitment to organization change, 
such as the change from the MALSP to the MALSP II, early in the process.  Leaders, 
such as MALS COs, aircraft maintenance officers (AMOs), production control officers 
(PCOs), AIRSpeed officers, and MMCOs, need to transmit a clear vision between the 
past (the MALSP) and the future (the MALSP II).  For changes to a system as complex as 
the Marine logistics system, there are bound to be unforeseen consequences to change.  
Robbins and Judge (2012) listed education and communication as the first tactics in 
overcoming resistance to change.  Educating not only the policy-makers but also the 
tactical subordinates in the trenches will dramatically increase the chances for a 
successful MALSP II implementation.  As mentioned previously, senior policy-making 
leaders often overestimate their knowledge of the intricate workings of a system and 
create many unintended consequences by formulating and implementing a strategy that 
does not anticipate these unforeseen effects.  When discussing the NAE strategic plan, 
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Lieutenant General Robling (2011) stated, “One of our goals … was to stimulate 
collaboration and transparency” (Naval Aviation Enterprise [NAE] Public Affairs, 2011, 
p. 1).  Many unintended consequences created by a lack of knowledge of strategic 
managers can be corrected by increasing the transparency of MALSP II implementation, 
educating the logistics community stakeholders, and soliciting collaboration from tactical 
logisticians. Receiving inputs from tactical operators can solve potential problems before 
they become an issue.  Educating stakeholders, communicating strategic goals, and 
soliciting collaboration from the lowest levels will ensure a successful transition from the 
MALSP to the MALSP II. 
Leaders should not underestimate the inertia of sticky routines and ingrained 
culture.  Implementing change in a system as complex as the Navy and Marine Corps 
logistics system takes a long period of time.  As we mentioned previously, it is common 
knowledge that people and organizations resist change.  Change as dramatic and 
potentially lengthy as the proposed MALSP II change needs to be done in chunks, with 
clearly identified periods of transition.  All stakeholders from top to bottom need to be 
committed, involved, and educated on the strategic vision.  Figure 8 depicts the inertia 
that will initially prevent the logistics community from easily changing from the MALSP 
to the MALSP II and what is needed to overcome the inertia.  After a quarter of a century 
of ingrained procedures and practices, a combination of initiatives that specifically 
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Figure 8.   Revolutionary Change in an Organization7 
2. Addressing Ingrained Culture 
The Marine Corps has a proud history of a strong culture that has knit Marines 
together toward a common cause.  Over time, this culture has created strong group 
inertia, preventing individuals from changing even if they choose to do so.  This 
development of strong culture also appears in subgroups such as particular military 
occupational specialties.  In order to overcome strong cultures or subcultures that 
facilitate practical drift (such as one that justifies and allows UPLs), Sorensen (2002) 
recommended that change be done incrementally because studies have shown that 
organizations with strong cultures excel at incremental change but will typically fail in 
implementing radical change (pp. 70–91).  Merck’s CEO, Dick Clark, is often quoted for 
his statement,  
The fact is, culture eats strategy for lunch. You can have a good strategy in place, 
but if you do not have the culture and enabling systems that allow you to 
successfully implement that strategy, the culture of the organization will defeat 
the strategy. (Jones, 2007, p. 3)   
                                                 
7 We adapted the idea presented in this figure from notes taken in Professor Nick Dew’s spring 2012 
class for the Strategic Management (GB4014) course at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
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It is imperative to manage the stakeholders that have a vested interest for the strategy to 
succeed or to fail.  Not everyone involved will want to change. In order to increase the 
probability for success under the MALSP II, behaviors that undermine the ability of the 
MALSP II to function, or to be proven effective, must be eliminated. 
3. Addressing Leadership Failures 
The factors that lead to leadership failure, such as a fear of the unknown and a 
lack of skills to carry out the change, can be mitigated through Robbins and Judge’s 
(2012) first tactics in addressing organizational change: education and communication.  
By educating the stakeholders on the process—where it is, where it is going, how we are 
going to get there, and why it is in their best interests—as well as keeping an open “two-
way” dialogue between policy-makers, implementers, and tactical logisticians, leaders 
can overcome an attachment to the status quo.  Brooks (2008) pointed out that as with 
AIRSpeed before it, MALSP II education needs to be 
extensive. [I]t must also be effective. Effective training must be specific, 
militarily focused, and taught by Marines. Training needs to be at 
appropriate level. Work center supervisors need a different level of 
proficiency and skills than do technicians. Training needs to be tailored to 
the military, specifically to the squadron level. Courses should avoid 
corporate jargon and examples and rely on military application. If 
possible, the curriculum should focus on individual specialties, or classes 
should integrated examples from all specialties to emphasize global 
applicability. Training needs to be given by Marines, not civilian 
contractors. Marine instructors have inherent understanding of 
improvement challenges, immediate credibility, and knowledge to answer 
military-centric questions. (p. 9) 
Incentives are another huge part of implementing change and innovation that will 
allow leaders to overcome an attachment to the status quo.  Brooks (2008) asserted, 
“Commanders must publicly identify individuals, work centers, and event teams that 
have improved the squadron’s ability to perform its mission” (p. 10).  Recognizing 
individuals who have incorporated MALSP II modernization efforts and improved the 
squadron’s capability to accomplish the mission will not only reward those who have 
made a significant contribution to the modernization effort and mission accomplishment 
but also send a clear message that the chain of command supports the vision of the 
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MALSP II.  Equally important to recognizing those who make a concrete, significant 
contribution to the MALSP II modernization and mission accomplishment is avoiding 
recognition of those who have not earned the right to be recognized through hard work 
and effort.  It is severely demoralizing for Marines to see other Marines receive 
undeserved recognition, and this approach to recognition can derail any effort aimed at 
organizational change.   
Read and Dew’s forthcoming study of 16,605 business organizations showed that 
three vital factors facilitate innovation and change: autonomy (30%), incentives (22%), 
and organizational support (36%; p. 6).  Read and Dew’s research suggested that for a 
wide-scale change to occur successfully, clear incentives and organizational support need 
to be in place.  Experienced and educated leaders that support the initiative can make this 
happen. 
Leaders of future MALSs who are charged with MALSP II modernization need to 
be highly educated on the MALSP II vision and support subordinate implementation.  
Because organizational support is shown to have the largest effect on innovation and 
change, it is imperative that leadership of the MALSs show avid support through action 
rather than indifference through inaction.  Harry and Linsenmann (2006) argued the 
necessity of leadership in assisting with “developing vision, empowering change agents, 
mobilizing commitment, installing support systems, auditing change and controlling the 
change process” (p. 20).  Command leadership will be the linchpin in educating 
subordinates on the MALSP II modernization effort, communicating the program’s 
importance to the warfighter, and providing appropriate incentives for MALSP II 
implementation.  
Key leaders in the MALSP II modernization effort include the MALS CO, the 
MALS AIRSpeed officer, PCO, and repairables management division officer (RMD-O), 
and O-Level MMCOs.  These officers are capable of overcoming the old supply–
maintenance rivalry and working together to implement the doctrinal change to the 
MALSP II.  A good example of competent leadership necessary to promote 
organizational change was the AIRSpeed implementation effort at MALS-11 in 2008.  
Under the leadership of then-Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Chipman, the 
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AIRSpeed process was implemented.  This initiative was a huge shift in the business 
practices for the Marines.  All levels of leadership at MALS-11 aggressively supported 
the incorporation of TOC, Lean, and CPI practices, which ensured successful 
implementation.  Alternatively, some commands have not fully embraced the AIRSpeed 
process.  As a result, CPI efforts have plateaued.  In order to successfully transition to the 
MALSP II as a Marine Corps, AIRSpeed programs must be the focus of effort for the 
MALS commander because these processes are essential prerequisites to MALSP II 
implementation. 
In order to successfully overcome organizational barriers and facilitate the 
transition to the MALSP II, the MALSP II program office should seek buy-in from key 
leaders.  Educated leaders capable of communicating a clear vision of the transition from 
the MALSP to the MALSP II to subordinates are essential in overcoming sticky routines.  
UPLs, as well as the subculture that enables them, must be addressed at all levels of 
Marine Corps aviation. Organizational COs, AMOs, MMCOs, and maintenance control 
chiefs must be educated on the negative effects that maintaining UPLs have on aviation 
funding and readiness and shown that maintaining UPLs will not be tolerated.  Finally, 
incentives need to be created to deter the use of UPLs now and in the future. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 42 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 43 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
V. INVENTORY 
The MALSP is the current concept that Marine aviation uses to sustain aircraft 
readiness through the maintenance of aircraft and the supply of aircraft parts.  
Sustainment of aircraft readiness is achieved by having the right parts, personnel, and 
equipment on hand to repair the weapon system and return the aircraft to operational 
capability as rapidly as possible. 
A. ON-HAND AVAILABILITY 
Aviation assets play a key role in how the Marine Corps successfully fights and 
wins battles.  As a result, FMC aircraft are necessary to ensure that Marines are able to 
fight and win wars.  The degradation of aircraft parts and the availability of replacements 
are constant challenges for the aviation logistics community.  In an effort to maximize the 
available on-hand inventory and aircraft readiness, the MALSP program office has made 
efforts to realign all processes with the end goal of increased aircraft readiness in mind.  
End-to-end (E2E) alignment is an integrated application of many CPI processes 
aimed at improving processes and increasing parts availability to the fleet.  E2E is a 
global view of the entire Marine aviation logistics chain.  As such, it focuses on not only 
the O-Level and I-Level squadrons but also the depot-level (D-Level) and NAE logistics 
providers.  Ready-for-issue (RFI) inventory is an important part of the MALSP II 
initiative.  DCA Policy Letter 03-11 (DCA, 2011a) specifically addressed E2E: 
(3) Utilize and integrate E2E designs and AIRSpeed Continuous 
Process Improvement (CPI) methodologies and best practices to gain 
efficiencies and/or effectiveness in order to align the availability of both 
aircraft and replacement parts to CR deployed standards. (p. 1) 
We identify two barriers with this requirement: 
 From our experience, CPI methodologies are not uniformly implemented 
throughout the aviation community, and AIRSpeed has yet to be 
implemented at the O-Level fleet-wide. 
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 According to the MALSP II & Marine Aviation Logistics Enterprise 
Information Technology report (Clark, 2010), the IMA can repair only 
approximately 33% of all repairable items (p. 7).8  In order to effectively 
implement E2E design, a focused depot-level (D-Level) maintenance 
integration under the MALSP II is essential.  The current requirements for 
IOC do not specifically address depot integration; only the need to 
synchronize with a parts’ designated overhaul point. 
Although there has been less focus on the O-Level with respect to CPI and E2E, 
the MALSP II team has been working closely with the D-Level maintenance facility in 
Cherry Point, NC. During the past year, the MALSP II team has employed several 
initiatives to implement E2E, reduce TRR, and ensure that a steady supply of RFI repair 
parts is available to the fleet.  Figure 9 depicts the E2E synchronization effort across all 
levels of maintenance, in garrison as well as in an expeditionary environment. 
 
Figure 9.   E2E: Synchronizing the Logistics Chain 
(DCA, 2011b) 
                                                 
8 These are individual component repair list (ICRL) capability codes.  C1 refers to full repair, and C3 
refers to limited repair.  
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Fleet readiness centers (FRCs) have a considerable effect on inventory available to 
the fleet.  If processes are not synchronized toward a common goal (e.g., reducing TRR), 
then non-RFI parts can quickly accumulate at depots, reducing the parts availability and 
readiness rates of the fleet.  As such, FRC East has made considerable efforts toward 
improving its TRR; unfortunately, the effort has yielded little fruit in the past.  According 
to FRC East MALSP II coordinator David Campbell, in 2002, contractors were paid 
approximately $5 million to bring the TOC and drum buffer rope (DBR; a CPI solution 
derived from TOC) into the depot and received various sums of money for continued 
support thereafter.  Around 2007, FRC East received approximately $8 million from 
HQMC to implement CPI programs with the expected return on investment of 6:1.  
According to David Campbell, the improvements never materialized.  He discussed the 
recent reorganization of FRC East and the roughly $4.5 million paid to contractors hired 
to assist in developing a new CPI strategy.  The new system was coined the Enhanced 
Production Systems (EPS).  Campbell recently learned that the metrics the contractors 
were paid to develop are being discontinued and the whole effort is being reconsidered.  
So the question many may have is, what part of nearly $20 million was used to reduce 
TRR? 
In the business sector, companies such as General Electric have CPI teams that 
report directly to the chief executive officer (CEO).  These individuals are the critical 
enablers.  With the direct support of the CEO, they are empowered to overcome many of 
the organizational barriers discussed in the previous chapter and make considerable 
improvements that relate directly to the bottom line.  We surmise that part of the reason 
the improved results never materialized was that (1) there was no direct link from the 
AIRSpeed office to the CO, and (2) incentives were not tied directly to the end goal—
reduction in TRR. 
FRC East disbanded its AIRSpeed office sometime between 2011 and 2012 (D. 
Campbell, personal communication, August 27, 2012).  As previously discussed, 
AIRSpeed is a specific term used in naval aviation to represent CPI.  DoD Directive 
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5010.42 (DoD, 2008) mandated that all DoD components9 and activities are to have a 
CPI program.  We were concerned that the lack of an AIRSpeed office could have 
negative effects on aircraft parts inventory available for fleet consumption.   
We asked Campbell whether he thought that the FRC East needed an AIRSpeed 
office and whether the lack of an AIRSpeed office would have a negative effect on 
aircraft parts availability in the fleet. Campbell provided the following response: 
The question about the need for an AIRSpeed office could be clearly 
answered by saying ‘no,’ but to make that statement, there must absolutely 
be some system in place that will focus on improving our ability to 
provide quality products to the customer at the rate at which they need 
them.  In a depot with strong leadership principals at all levels of 
management with the full understanding of what goes on at Forward 
Operating Bases, a CPI team may be unnecessary, but until such time 
occurs, there has to be some number of folks that do understand and are 
aggressively trying to drive down TRR. (D. Campbell, personal 
communication, August 27, 2012) 
Driving down TRR is exactly where Campbell and the MALSP II team are 
currently aggressively focused.  According to Campbell, the FRC East MALSP II 
coordinator, 
Since working with the MALSP team for about a year now with an 
investment of only time spent in meetings, the FRC has not spent a dime 
on this initiative.  If the MALSP effort rolls out as planned, the FRC will 
experience gains far beyond what any contractor could have given us in 
the next twenty years and all at a cost of $0.  Why is this? Because we will 
align our organization in a way that makes folks accountable.  We will put 
the metrics in place that will not filter truth from the XO and CO.  It is 
very hard to fix what you don’t know is wrong.  Rewarding people, 
helping them understand and making them a part of the solution is how 
you change a culture. (D. Campbell, personal communication, 
August 27, 2012) 
Through communication, education, and developing a set of metrics that ties 
incentives to the end goal of reducing TRR, the collaborative effort of FRC East and the 
                                                 
9 DoD components are defined as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the 
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Office 
of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the defense agencies, the DoD field activities, and 
all other organizational entities in the DoD. 
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MALSP II team should yield substantial results in reducing TRR by increasing material 
availability. 
Regardless of whether they are called AIRSpeed or CPI teams, it is imperative 
that production organizations have a CPI team that has a direct link to the CO or 
executive officer (XO) and is empowered to shatter organizational barriers that can 
hinder real, positive change.  Although it is critical that these teams have the power to 
implement change, changes that do not directly relate to the end goal of reducing TRR 
should not be entertained.   
B. ADDRESSING SHRINK 
When I- and D-Level repair facilities lack the necessary parts (inventory levels) to 
repair assemblies, their TRR is negatively affected.  There are numerous variables that 
affect inventory levels.  Shrink (loss of inventory), whether at the D-Level or system 
wide, is one aspect of inventory that can seriously degrade combat readiness and present 
a hard barrier to the implementation of the MALSP II.  Shrink can occur through the use 
of UPLs, parts lost in shipment, improper storage and tracking, or a myriad of other 
ways.  Addressing shrink could have a positive impact on TRR by ensuring that I-Level 
and D-Level repair facilities have the parts needed to repair assemblies.  Additionally, 
addressing shrink will increase material availability, aircraft readiness, and increase the 
likelihood of successful operations under the MALSP II.  Regardless of operating under 
the MALSP or the MALSP II, appropriate inventory levels need to be available in the 
naval supply system, or readily available in the private sector to support the warfighter 
with an acceptable TRR.  Master Sergeant Nicholson, senior enlisted SME on the 
MALSP team, pointed out that a barrier we have to implementing the MALSP II is a lack 
of inventory; however, he qualified this idea with the following: 
A barrier for us is how we populate the buffers parts-wise.  A huge 
initiative—and I’ll say this on record and you’re going to hear me say it 
several times—MALSP modernization is not fixing the local pack ups to 
date.  If there’s a problem supporting local pack ups—and let me give you 
an example.  So, CH53, PCSP, CCSP, there’s a problem with them today.  
The amount of money it’s going to take to fix those allowances today is 
not MALSP II, it’s not MALSP modernization.  It is fixing the allowances 
today in support of MALSP.  MALSP modernization is something 
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different.  We did this two years ago with the buffers for Bahrain and 
Horn of Africa (HOA).  There were some Allowance Change Requests 
(ACRs) that needed to be submitted.  It was not for supporting the buffers 
[under MALSP II]; it was ACRs that needed to be submitted for the 
support what they need today [under MALSP]. (Nicholson, personal 
communication, August 27, 2012) 
Inventory shortages could potentially reduce the probability of success under the 
MALSP II or prevent the MALSP II from being proven effective. However, any 
inventory barriers that exist are due to shortages in inventory levels required under the 
current MALSP program.  Addressing these shortfalls will assist in a smoother transition 
to the MALSP II.  One way to combat these inventory shortfalls is to have an accurate 
real-time account of inventory in the system.  
There are many technologies in the commercial sector that are focusing on 
reducing shrink and increasing inventory accountability.  Promising technologies 
currently in use are radio frequency identification (RFID) and unique identification 
(UID).  The use of these technologies would produce tangible benefits in the form of 
cost, time, better maintenance planning through parts tracking, reduction in UPL usage 
through location tracking, and life cycle tracking.  These technologies would also add 
greater visibility and traceability to parts in the system in route to delivery points and 
address carcass retrograde issues, achieving the real-time visibility mentioned in DCA 
Policy Letter 03-11 (DCA, 2011a).  Apte and Ferrer (2010) succinctly pointed out the 
many benefits of jointly using UID and RFID in tracking high-value aviation parts (see 
Figure 10), all of which lead to a decrease in TRR (p. 24). 
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Figure 10.   Benefits From Jointly Using RFID and UID Life Cycle Tracking 
(From Apte & Ferrer, 2010) 
Figure 10 illustrates the benefits associated with using UID and RFID 
technologies concurrently.  Doing so provides increased inventory accountability by 
providing traceability, real-time visibility, automation, item loss reduction, waste 
reduction, life cycle tracking of high-value parts, increased capacity, and information 
reliability.  All of these benefits translate to increased operational availability. 
Inventory will play a key role in the success of the MALSP II modernization 
effort, as parts availability is critical to demonstrate the effectiveness of the program.  In 
order to facilitate the transition to the MALSP II, Marine aviation must acquire greater 
accountability of its aircraft parts inventory and more efficient depot processes that will 
ensure a steady stream of RFI parts to the fleet.  Complete E2E alignment from the O-
Level to the D-Level and CPI teams at depot facilities with direct liaison to the CO will 
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facilitate this accountability and efficiency.  Finally, UID and RFID technology must be 
used concurrently in order to gain greater inventory accountability and drastically reduce 
inefficiency. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
The United States Marine Corps has been the country’s preeminent force in 
readiness for over 237 years.  This has been possible through constant reevaluation of 
mission requirements and the ability to tailor the force to meet the mission.  Since the end 
of the Cold War, the United States has faced a myriad of challenges, from humanitarian 
relief efforts in Japan and Haiti to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Throughout this period, the Marine Corps has successfully met these challenges, which 
span the ROMO.  However, the increasing need to support multiple small-scale 
contingency operations simultaneously is stretching the limits of the current MALSP. 
In order to address current shortfalls with the MALSP, modernization of MALSP 
II will require a paradigm shift from a “push system,” commonly referred to as the “iron 
mountain,” to a “pull system.”  A combination of IT, CPI, E2E, demand pattern analysis, 
education and training, and increased inventory accountability and visibility will facilitate 
a successful transition and achieve one of the primary end goals; a decrease of TRR.  The 
important piece that ties modernization efforts together is IT. 
IT is identified in Revision A to Policy Letter 03-11 (DCA, 2012) as a critical 
enabler for modernization efforts.  Currently, the software required to implement the shift 
from “push” to “pull” is either not in development, lacks funding, or both.  The five 
software applications that comprise the MAL-EIT software suite have not been 
designated as programs of record and lack the oversight that the JCIDS process provides.  
Based on the current status of software development and the current IOC schedule 
identified in Revision A to Policy Letter 3-11 (DCA, 2012)—fourth quarter FY2014—we 
recommend a reevaluation of the current IOC schedule and a designation of MAL-EIT as 
a program of record.  Although this will increase the probability of a successful MALSP 
II modernization, aviation logisticians must also address organizational behaviors that are 
counterproductive to modernization efforts. 
Organizational behavior dominates Marine aviation.  Marines are accustomed to 
routines and are naturally resistant to change.  In order for MALSP II modernization to be 
successful, overcoming this resistance to change is essential.  The MALSP II 
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modernization efforts are all interrelated.  For example, implementation of AIRSpeed 
initiatives and CPI efforts are critical to a reduction in the TRR.  TRR minimization is 
essential to reducing the variation in parts availability.  Therefore, changing the way that 
Marines conceptualize their role in logistical support is vital to the paradigm shift.  
Education on E2E integration is required for all personnel, Marines and civilians, from 
the O-Level to the D-Level.  Furthermore, any culture that allows deviation from Marine 
Corps Aviation Desktop procedures, such as the use of UPLs, should be discouraged 
because it can negatively affect inventory visibility and increase costs. 
In order to decrease costs and increase parts availability, Marine aviation must 
acquire greater accountability of its aircraft parts inventory and more efficient depot 
processes that will ensure a steady stream of RFI parts to the fleet.  The limited repair 
capabilities of the O- and I-Levels demand that D-Level maintenance processes are 
efficient, responsive, and reliable.  In order to achieve these goals, we have identified 
three key initiatives that will increase the probability of effective modernization efforts.  
First, the CPI team must have a direct line of communication to the CO of the depot.  
This direct line will empower the CPI team to shatter current organizational barriers that 
inhibit change.  Second, incentives at the D-Level need to be linked to TRR reduction.  
These incentives will encourage a unity of effort among all D-Level personnel. Finally, 
the ability to increase asset visibility will assist in reducing inventory shortages 
throughout the supply system and increase the prospects for success under the MALSP II.  
We further recommend the implementation of UID and RFID technologies in tracking 
high-value aviation assets.  This implementation will enable real-time visibility, 
traceability, item loss reduction, and ultimately, increased operational availability.   
MALSP II modernization is essential for the success of the ACE in support of the 
MAGTF.  The determination and will of senior leadership to implement this change is 
likely. However, the modernization effort may not achieve desired effects and could cost 
time and money and result in a less reliable and responsive system if leaders act on sheer 
determination alone.  By reevaluating the current IOC requirements, properly developing 
a funded MAL-EIT as a program of record, confronting problematic organizational 
behaviors, ensuring that CPI and E2E are effectively implemented at the O-Level to D-
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Level, and increasing asset visibility throughout the supply system, leaders will increase 
the probability of a more responsive and reliable system that supports the warfighter. 
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